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This article shows how the ECB quantitative easing policy has generated excess liquidity 
within the euro area, promoting financial flows between countries. This contributed to a 
positive balance in the 2015 financial account of Spain’s balance of payments excluding 
the central bank, which is higher than the surplus on the current and capital accounts. As 
a result, last year the Banco de España’s negative external position increased, although the 
nature of these flows differs notably from that in the period of sovereign debt stress in 
2012. On the whole, the net debtor position of the Spanish economy decreased in 2015, 
while major net investment flows into Spain were forthcoming from non-residents.
In mid-2014 the ECB embarked on a new expansionary phase in its monetary policy, with 
the announcement of a series of non-conventional measures. These included the setting 
of a negative deposit facility interest rate, the provision of targeted longer-term refinancing 
operations (TLTROs) under highly favourable conditions, and the purchase of assets, 
initially securitisations and covered bonds and subsequently, in 2015, extended to 
sovereign bonds and other government securities. The application of these new measures 
entailed, as at March 2016, the acquisition of public and private securities by the 
Eurosystem for €833 billion and the granting of loans with terms of up to four years to 
credit institutions (CIs) for €425 billion. Although a considerable volume of prior loans has 
also been repaid, the result was a significant increase in the Eurosystem’s balance sheet 
and a notable rise in excess reserves (deposits in the central bank exceeding the minimum 
regulatory requirements) of euro area CIs.
The Banco de España (BE) participated in these operations, granting funds to Spanish CIs 
through TLTROs and providing liquidity through security purchases. However, the volume 
of excess reserves of Spanish institutions in the central bank has hardly grown since then, 
which indicates that the net liquidity provided has gone to players resident in other euro 
area countries. As explained in this article, this raised the Banco de España’s net external 
debt – mainly in the form of liabilities to the rest of the Eurosystem – the origin and nature 
of which differ notably from 2012. Back then, the Spanish economy was facing a crisis of 
confidence which sparked a significant outflow of funds abroad, mainly through portfolio 
divestments and the non-renewal of loans by non-residents. Last year, in contrast, portfolio 
investments in Spain amounted to €62 billion, with particularly high purchases of medium- 
and long-term Spanish government debt instruments. For its part, the reduction of loans 
and deposits from the rest of the world in the past year was more a reflection of the 
decisions adopted by residents (particularly credit institutions) to reduce their indebtedness 
in view of the abundant liquidity and the rise in available funds associated with the current 
and capital account surpluses.
This article focuses on the role played by the recent Eurosystem measures in the performance 
of the financial account of Spain’s balance of payments in 2015. The following section 
describes how the provision of liquidity by a central bank, through loans or security purchases, 
results in increases in commercial banks’ reserves in that central bank and how institutions’ 
actions can change the distribution of those reserves among banks, but the total remains 
broadly unchanged. Thus, the expansionary impact expected from quantitative easing 
policies does not depend on the final destination of the reserves generated within euro area 
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credit institutions, but rather on the downward effect that the increase in reserves has on 
asset interest rates and the resulting incentive to grant and request new loans. Subsequently, 
the third section analyses the particular case of the Eurosystem, in which national central 
banks (NCBs) and the ECB co-exist in a single monetary area. This gives rise to intra-
Eurosystem assets and liabilities (between the central banks of the area). We explain how 
these arise and their relationship with the external financial flows of the Spanish economy. 
Lastly, the fourth section reviews the course of these financial flows in the past year.
In a monetary area with a single central bank, when the latter acquires an asset from a 
resident CI, the counterpart of that transaction in the liabilities of the central bank is 
generally a deposit in the seller’s name. These liabilities are normally referred to as “central 
bank reserves” and, together with cash, they constitute the monetary base. Only resident 
CIs are authorised to hold reserves in the central bank and, therefore, all the latter’s 
transactions must involve a resident CI in some way.
Chart 1 shows the associated process. The left-hand column shows a situation in which 
the central bank purchases securities from a resident CI and the right-hand column shows 
a situation in which the purchases are made from third-party players (euro area residents 
or non-residents). In both cases, the central bank’s balance sheet increases, with assets 
growing by the amount of the securities acquired and liabilities growing by the volume of 
the CIs’ reserves. In the first case, the counterpart of this transaction in the balance sheet 
of the CI that sells the securities is a change in the composition of its assets: there is a 
reduction in securities held and an increase, of the same amount, in reserves, with no 
change in the balance sheets of the other players. In the second case, since the other 
players cannot hold reserves in the central bank, a resident CI acts as intermediary in the 
transaction, so the seller obtains deposits in a CI as the counterpart of the securities sold. 
In turn, the CI records an equivalent increase in deposits, on the liability side, and in central 
bank reserves, on the asset side.
Importantly, in either case the resident CIs end up with a higher volume of reserves. 
Something similar occurs with liquidity-providing monetary policy operations, where there 
is also an increase in the central bank’s balance sheet, as a result of larger loans to CIs, on 
the asset side, and of larger CI reserves, on the liability side. Chart 2 shows the situation 
of the Eurosystem as a whole (i.e. as a single central bank) at 2014 and 2015 year-end, 
with an increase in the balance sheet between the two year-ends of €573 billion. This 
figure coincides almost exactly with the €571 billion increase in holdings of euro-
denominated securities as a result of the debt purchase programme.1 On the liability side, 
reserves increased by somewhat less (€402 billion) because other items also grew.
Faced with a higher volume of central bank reserves, individual CIs can reduce these 
reserves by using them, for example, to acquire assets or settle liabilities. However, since 
only resident CIs can hold these reserves, if a resident CI makes a payment with them, it 
has to be to another resident CI and the aggregate balance of reserves will not vary.2 Only 
by acquiring assets from or settling liabilities to the central bank can the aggregate level of 
reserves be reduced. However, since the Eurosystem is acquiring securities, not selling 
The central bank’s 
quantitative easing 
measures and their effects 
on liquidity
1  Euro loans to MFIs did not grow in 2015 despite the liquidity provided in TLTROs, because in the same period 
the funds granted in the VLTROs carried out in 2011-2012 matured, and, at the same time, institutions reduced 
the volume requested in other Eurosystem liquidity-providing operations.
2  Thus, for example, if the reserves are used to acquire new assets from an investment fund, the reserves are 
transferred as payment to the CI at which the fund has a deposit account. In the case of the granting of a loan, 
the reserves end up at the CI used by the individual or company owning the assets or supplying the goods and 
services acquired with the loan.
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them, CIs as a whole can only reduce reserves by converting them into cash or repaying 
loans received from the central bank. The former incurs storage, transport and insurance 
costs, which makes it less attractive. As for the latter, nowadays the bulk of loans received 
by CIs from the Eurosystem are long-term and, moreover, the institutions that have excess 
reserves are not necessarily the same institutions that hold funds lent by the Eurosystem.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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CHART 1EFFECTS OF THE EUROSYSTEM SECURITIES PURCHASE PROGRAMME
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As a result of the foregoing, reserves will circulate between resident CIs depending on 
how willing they – and their clients – are to hold excess liquid assets. Holding such 
assets comes at a cost, namely the deposit facility interest rate (currently -0.4%). 
Therefore, whether they do so or not depends on the alternatives available. Purchasing 
other assets (or granting loans) will only generate higher expected returns (or lower 
costs) if these assets have a higher risk level. Alternatively, debt repayment is another 
option for the CIs that are in a position to do so (because their  liabilities are short term 
or repayable early) and whose cost of debt exceeds the (negative) return on reserves. 
The outcome of these transactions will be a redistribution of reserves among resident 
CIs, such that they will tend to flow to those with a lower relative opportunity cost of 
holding excess liquidity. 
This process may also involve transactions with non-residents of the area. However, as 
explained above, in a monetary area with a single central bank this does not alter the fact 
that the reserves must remain at a CI of the area. Moreover, assuming that the central bank 
does not intervene in the foreign exchange market, any cross-border purchase of assets 
(or settlement of liabilities) must have a counterpart transaction involving non-residents 
which finances the first transaction (usually an increase in non-resident deposits at a 
resident CI or a decrease in the latter’s deposits abroad), so that the financial account of 
the balance of payments remains balanced. 
The euro area is a special case of the foregoing analysis, since it is a single monetary area 
that is, however, composed of several countries with their respective central banks and the 
ECB. This has several implications. Firstly, the redistribution of central bank reserves 
described above no longer occurs only in one country but rather among euro area countries 
and, therefore, it affects their balances of payments.
Also, this introduces the additional possibility that, under the Eurosystem asset purchase 
programme, the NCB may purchase securities from a resident in another euro area country. 
In this case the premise in the previous section, i.e. that the counterpart is always an 
increase in the reserves of CIs resident in the country, is no longer true, but rather, by 
contrast, there is an increase in the reserves which the CIs located in the seller’s country 
of residence hold in their respective NCB.
The case 
of the Eurosystem
SOURCE: European Central Bank.
a The sum of the items may not coincide exactly with the total due to rounding.
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Lastly, the counterpart of payments between institutions of different euro area countries 
does not necessarily have to be a decrease (increase) in the deposits abroad (from abroad) 
of the paying institution; rather, if the payment is made through the TARGET system, as is 
usual, the counterpart is a change in the net position in TARGET of the respective NCBs 
(see Box 1).
In 2015, due to the design of the Eurosystem public sector purchase programme (PSPP), 
the purchases were largely made in a decentralised manner, by the various NCBs and in 
proportion to their ECB capital key, which is related to the population and GDP of each 
country. Thus, the balance sheets of all the NCBs in the area increased more or less 
proportionately, with growth in both their assets and their liabilities. This is illustrated in 
Chart 3, where the first bar for each country represents the purchases of general 
government securities in 2015 as a proportion of GDP. In the absence of other factors, 
this should also have resulted in an equivalent expansion of the reserves of each country’s 
CIs in their respective NCBs. However, as the second bars in the chart show, this was not 
the case. In Spain, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia there was a much smaller 
increase in reserves, while reserves grew by more than government debt purchases in 
countries such as Cyprus, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, indicating a certain 
redistribution of liquidity among euro area countries.3 Since this occurred largely through 
TARGET, the different results across countries are also reflected in the change in the 
position of each NCB in that system, as shown by the third bars of Chart 3. Thus, in the 
case of Spain, there is a decline in the BE’s net position (higher liabilities), while in the case 
of Luxembourg and the Netherlands the net position rises. In any event, the relationship 
is not exact, since there are other factors (TLTRO, cash holdings, etc.) that also influence 
the changes in the balance sheet of each central bank that are not taken into consideration 
in the chart.
Chart 4 shows in greater detail the changes in the BE’s balance sheet in 2015. In the year 
as a whole, it grew by just over €85 billion. On the asset side, the increase was mainly in 
euro-denominated securities, as a result of the PSPP. On the liability side, the chart shows 
SOURCES: European Central Bank and Eurostat.
a Sovereign debt purchases in Greece were zero and in Cyprus they were less than the key, due to non-compliance with the conditions of the purchase programme 
during all or part of the period. In these two countries and in another in which the volume of existing sovereign debt was insufficient, the respective NCBs purchased 
other securities (supranational debt and replacement assets) to reach their capital key. These purchases are not included in the chart. The changes for Lithuania are 
from January 2015, when it joined the euro area.
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that the CIs’ reserves in the central bank also rose, albeit by much less (scarcely €10 
billion), while intra-Eurosystem liabilities (recorded under deposits of MFIs in other euro 
area countries) rose significantly.
Thus the evidence shows that a large portion of the net liquidity provided by the BE under 
the Eurosystem quantitative easing policy tended to flow abroad, either because the BE’s 
purchases were directly from non-residents or because residents used the funds obtained 
to make payments abroad. In view of the high foreign debt of the Spanish economy, it is to 
be expected that the opportunity cost of maintaining the fresh liquidity as excess central 
bank reserves would be higher in Spain than in other euro area countries, which would 
explain this effect and would have contributed to the positive balance of the 2015 financial 
account of the Spanish economy excluding the Banco de España. Further, as explained in 
Box 1, the counterpart of these changes is an increase in the BE’s intra-Eurosystem 
liabilities, which is analysed in the following section. It should be noted, however, that this 
does not mean that the Eurosystem’s quantitative easing policy has been less effective in 
Spain. As noted above, its expected expansionary effect does not depend on the 
distribution of the reserves generated in the Eurosystem as a whole, but on the downward 
pressure exerted by these reserves on asset interest rates and the resulting greater 
incentive to grant and request new loans. Thus, regardless of the direction of the 
redistribution among institutions of the liquid assets generated, this effect on interest rates 
was even more intense in Spain than in the rest of the euro area.
In 2015 the Spanish economy posted a surplus of €21 billion on the current and capital 
accounts. This was the third consecutive year of positive balances following the almost 
zero balance in 2012 (see panel 1 of Chart 5). This surplus naturally coincides with a 
positive balance of the financial account (change in assets minus change in liabilities). 
However, as explained in the previous section, an analysis of the flows of the financial 
account of the balance of payments must take into account the fact that the foreign assets 
of the central bank (mainly foreign currency reserves and intra-Eurosystem assets) act 
largely as an adjusting item vis-à-vis changes in the other items. This explains why cross-
border financial flows are generally analysed excluding the BE.
Cross-border financial 
flows of the Spanish 
economy in 2015 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The sum of the items may not coincide exactly with the total due to rounding.
b Mainly intra-Eurosystem liabilities (net debtor position in TARGET).
c "Other liabilities" amounted to €4.5 million in December 2014 and €4.4 million in December 2015.
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Excluding the BE, in 2015 the financial account posted a positive balance (growth in 
foreign assets exceeded growth in liabilities) of €74 billion (compared with the practically 
zero balance of €-6 billion in 2014). This result was influenced partly by the higher available 
funds of Spanish residents taken as a whole, as a result of the current and capital account 
surpluses, since a portion of these savings was used to purchase foreign assets or to 
repay debts to the rest of the world. However, Chart 5 shows that the balance of the 
current and capital accounts is only one of the determinants of the net external financial 
flows excluding the BE. They also depend very significantly on the portfolio decisions of 
residents and non-residents. As mentioned above, the Eurosystem’s actions have partly 
shaped these flows, since the liquidity generated in Spain was largely channelled abroad.
Panel 2 of Chart 5 shows that the positive balance of the financial account excluding the BE 
is because net foreign asset purchases by residents exceeded the net incurrence of new 
liabilities. The former rose from €83 billion in 2014 to €121 billion in 2015, standing at relatively 
high levels in historical terms, while the latter fell from €89 billion to €48 billion. Nevertheless, 
the net flow of liabilities remained positive, unlike in 2012, when the tensions associated with 
the euro area sovereign debt market crisis triggered major reductions in foreign liabilities.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Financial derivatives are recorded as a net balance of net amounts and are assigned to the net change in assets.
b Excluding the change in financial derivatives, the amount of which is small.
c Net changes in liabilities are depicted with the sign changed.
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The acquisition of assets from non-residents rose in the three main functional categories 
(see panel 3 of Chart 5), albeit more notably in portfolio investments (€70 billion) and 
direct investments (€43 billion) than in other investments (€10 billion). In portfolio 
investment, against a background of low interest rates and a greater tendency towards 
the geographical diversification of their portfolios, other resident sectors (ORSs)4 
increased their net purchases of foreign equity securities (equity and investment fund 
shares/units) by 48% (to €51 billion) with respect to the previous year. These same players 
also acquired fixed-income securities issued by non-residents amounting to €21 billion 
(up 3%). As regards direct investment, there were increases in that made by both other 
monetary financial intermediaries (OMFIs) (+23%) and ORSs (+26%). All in all, the net 
direct investment flow abroad in 2015 was still considerably below the highs of 2007 
(€105 billion).
The reduction in the flow of liabilities in 2015 with respect to the previous year was very 
much due to the net reduction of other investment (€-35 billion as compared with a rise of 
€5 billion in 2014), which is mainly explained by the net decrease in interbank deposits 
(down €22 billion) due to the abundant liquidity generated by the Eurosystem’s quantitative 
easing measures. Net foreign direct investment in Spain fell moderately (from €25 billion to 
€20 billion), while portfolio investment in assets issued by residents remained high, slightly 
above the year-ago levels (€62 billion as compared with €59 billion in 2014). As indicated 
above, this contrasts with 2012, when the financial market tensions and international 
investors’ doubts regarding the Spanish economy triggered a net sale of Spanish securities 
in non-resident portfolios of €52 billion. In 2015, unlike three years ago, non-residents 
invested €70 billion in Spanish government debt securities, 96% of which were medium 
and long term.
Given that in 2015 the positive balance of the financial account excluding the BE (signifying 
higher payments on than receipts from cross-border financial transactions) exceeded the 
positive balance of the current and capital accounts – including errors and omissions – 
(signifying net receipts), the net flow of payments to the rest of the world was reflected in 
an increase in the BE’s liabilities to non-residents. Since the foreign currency reserves and 
other net external assets and liabilities of the central bank grew by €11 billion, there was 
an increase in the net debtor position vis-à-vis the Eurosystem of €51 billion. This rise 
interrupted the downtrend which started in 2013 when euro area financial market tensions 
eased (see panel 4 of Chart 5).
The increase in the intra-Eurosystem net debtor position should not be interpreted as 
signalling a resurgence of the Spanish economy’s financing problems. As explained in the 
foregoing section, the changes in intra-Eurosystem assets and liabilities reflect the net 
flows of receipts from and payments to the rest of the euro area. Sometimes these flows 
are not balanced and the economy experiences net outflows or inflows of funds. 
Nevertheless, this may have widely differing causes. In 2012, these payments largely 
resulted from divestments by the rest of the world of securities issued by residents and 
from the non-renewal of loans granted to residents by non-residents. In 2015, in contrast, 
as we have seen previously, non-residents continued to purchase large amounts of 
Spanish-issued securities, so the higher payments abroad can be explained by residents’ 
purchases of foreign assets, against a backdrop of low interest rates and stronger 
preference for the geographical diversification of portfolios, and by the reduction of 
interbank liabilities to non-resident institutions by Spanish CIs.
4  Other than MFIs and general government.
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The net international debtor position of the Spanish economy excluding the BE fell in 2015 
from €918 billion in December 2014 to €864 billion twelve months later as a result of the 
positive balance of the financial account, despite the counteracting effect of the net 
revaluation of assets and liabilities. Taking the BE into account, the improvement is smaller 
(from €995 billion to €978 billion). In any case, the aforementioned net debtor position is 
still very high, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP (90%), which shows the 
need to persevere in maintaining positive balances of the current and capital accounts for 
an extended period of time.
15.4.2016.
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Intra-Eurosystem assets arise as a result of the functioning of the 
euro area as a single monetary area in which various countries 
participate. Due to their particular nature, since the euro area was 
created, the statistics of the Banco de España (BE) have included 
a presentation of the balance of payments and international 
investment position, additional to that recommended by the 
international manuals, which clearly distinguishes the Banco de 
España’s financial account and, in particular, the net intra-
Eurosystem position.
The accompanying chart shows an example of how these intra-
Eurosystem assets are created.2 The case considered is a payment 
(which may be associated with a commercial transaction, such as 
the purchase of a good or service, or a financial transaction, such 
as the granting of a loan or the purchase of a security) by a client 
BOX 1INTRA-EUROSYSTEM ASSETS AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS1
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EXAMPLE OF THE CREATION OF INTRA-EUROSYSTEM POSITIONS: PAYMENT BY A CLIENT OF CI IN COUNTRY "A" TO A CLIENT OF CI IN 
COUNTRY "B"
A  INITIAL SITUATION
B  FINAL SITUATION
SOURCE: Banco de España.
1  For a more detailed analysis, see the BE methodological note entitled 
“Banco de España claims on the Eurosystem and the treatment of euro 
banknotes in the Balance of Payments and the International Investment 
Position” (http://www.bde.es/webbde/en/estadis/bpagos/bpabee.pdf).
2  See also Box 4 in the ECB Economic Bulletin no. 6/2015 and the article 
entitled “TARGET balances and monetary policy operations” in the ECB 
Monthly Bulletin of May 2013.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 13 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, APRIL 2016 THE EUROSYSTEM’S QUANTITATIVE EASING MEASURES AND THE FINANCIAL ACCOUNT
of a CI in country “A” to a client of another CI in country “B”, both 
within the euro area, which is made through TARGET. TARGET 
transactions are settled in the central bank reserve accounts of the 
various participating institutions. Thus, starting from the initial 
situation portrayed by the top panels of the chart, the payment 
involves a reduction in the reserves of the paying institution (CI in 
“A”) and an equal increase in the reserves of the collecting 
institution (CI in “B”). Both institutions, which act solely as 
intermediaries, transfer the related payment or receipt to their 
clients by charging or crediting the amount to their deposits in the 
CI.3 If the payment is between clients of institutions in the same 
country, both institutions hold their reserves in the same NCB and 
the transaction is settled simply with a change in reserve holder on 
the balance sheet of that NCB. However, in this example, each CI 
has its reserves in a different central bank. Therefore, settlement of 
the transactions requires an adjustment to assets and liabilities 
within the Eurosystem. In principle, the transaction would take 
place through the opening of a debtor position of the NCB in “A” 
vis-à-vis the NCB in “B”. However, TARGET’s functioning stipulates 
that, at the end of the day, the bilateral positions between the 
different NCBs and the ECB are netted and become net positions 
of each of them vis-à-vis the rest of the Eurosystem (net TARGET 
position). Thus, for example, if the NCB in “A” has had more 
payments to than receipts from the other NCBs (as in this case), a 
net liability is generated. In parallel, a net asset arises at the NCB 
in “B”. All of these positions disappear when all the various 
components of the Eurosystem are consolidated.
In short, any payment (receipt) between a Spanish resident and a 
resident of another euro area country using the private financial 
system is settled through TARGET and it results in a change in the 
BE’s TARGET position and in a change in Spanish CIs’ central 
bank reserves.4 When payments exceed receipts, reserves fall and 
intra-Eurosystem liabilities increase (or assets decrease), and vice 
versa when the former are less than the latter.
Thus, to a certain extent, intra-Eurosystem assets act, within the 
euro area, in a similar manner to the foreign currency reserves of 
central banks that do not form part of a monetary union. Net outflows 
of funds abroad reduce intra-Eurosystem assets and vice versa. 
However, there are significant differences between the two. While 
foreign currency reserves cannot be negative, intra-Eurosystem 
assets can be (i.e. intra-Eurosystem liabilities). Also, changes in 
intra-Eurosystem assets are automatic. They do not depend on the 
will of the central banks involved, but rather any euro area NCB is 
obliged to accept, as payment, deposits in another NCB in the euro 
area. This is the only way to ensure the existence of a single monetary 
policy in all euro area countries. It should also be noted that these 
liabilities are not callable and have no maturity.5 Thus, in principle, if 
the situation is not accompanied by national banking system 
imbalances that require correcting (such as, for example, problems 
of a lack of collateral or an overdependence on very short-term 
financing), these positions may persist over time.
BOX 1 INTRA-EUROSYSTEM ASSETS AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS (cont’d)
3  In the case of payments originated by CIs without intervention by clients, 
the change in reserves would be equivalent, but there would be no 
changes in clients’ deposits. For example, if the payment relates to the 
repayment of prior interbank loans of the CI in “B” to the CI in “A”, the 
counterpart would be lower interbank assets/liabilities in the respective 
CIs. If the payment relates to a purchase of bonds (or any other financial 
asset), the reduction in reserves of the CI in “A” would correspond to an 
increase in its holdings of bonds and the CI in “B” would record the 
opposite transaction. In any event, the change in reserves is identical to 
that of the case presented.
4  If the payment is not made through TARGET, the changes that are 
recorded will depend on how the operation is settled, but, as a 
counterpart in the financial account of the balance of payments, they will 
necessarily involve a decline in financial assets abroad and/or an 
increase in liabilities.
5  Also, they currently bear no interest, since their remuneration is set equal 
to the ECB’s official interest rate, which is currently zero.

